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ABSTRACT 
 
Society has a love-hate relationship with social media. 
Thanks to social media platforms, the world is more 
connected than ever before. But with the ever-growing 
dominance of social media there have come a mass of 
challenges. What is okay to post? What isn’t? And who or 
what should be regulating those standards? Platforms are 
now constantly criticized for their content regulation 
policies, sometimes because they are viewed as too harsh 
and other times because they are characterized as too lax. 
And naturally, the First Amendment quickly enters the 
conversation. Should social media platforms be subject to 
the First Amendment? Can—or should—users be able to 
assert their First Amendment rights against these platforms? 
This Article dives into the legal and policy implications 
surrounding the application of the First Amendment to 
social media platforms. Because the state action doctrine 
generally serves as a bar to enforcing constitutional 
restrictions on private actors, this Article examines these 
                                                 
* Copyright © 2019 Matthew P. Hooker. Juris Doctor Candidate, 2020, Wake 
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State University. Executive Editor, Wake Forest Law Review. Special thanks to 
my family (especially Chiedza) for their continued love and support during my 
academic pursuits. Many thanks also to Professor David S. Levine for his 
guidance as I researched and drafted this Article. 
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First Amendment questions in light of the state action 
doctrine, and more particularly its public function 
exception. This Article considers whether social media 
platforms fit within the public function exception and 
whether such an application is tenable and proper as a 
matter of law and public policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The internet has radically changed how people communicate and 
receive information.1 Gone are the days when a person’s message 
could only go as far as her voice could carry or to as many people 
as she had postage stamps. With social media, the opportunities for 
                                                 
1 See Mark Lemley, Davis S. Levine & David G. Post, Don’t Break the 
Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34, 37 (2011) (calling the internet “a global 
platform for innovation, speech, collaboration, civic engagement, and economic 
growth.”). 
2
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connection are nearly limitless.2 In light of social media’s status and 
role, this Article will examine whether social media platforms 
should be treated as state actors under the public function exception 
so that users may assert First Amendment rights against those 
platforms. 
Every advance in technology raises new challenges and 
questions. For every beneficial use of social media, there are 
countless harmful uses, ranging from hate speech to fake news to 
online harassment.3 In response, social media platforms4 employ 
content regulation policies that dictate what content is appropriate 
and acceptable to be posted.5 But these policies have come under 
extensive criticism due to their ambiguity or arbitrary application.6 
Some say these platforms are not doing enough, and others contend 
that these guidelines impinge on free speech values.7 
Although the First Amendment protects rights regarding 
freedom of speech and expression, those protections do not serve as 
a check on private actors due to the state action doctrine.8 However, 
                                                 
2 See infra Section I.A. 
3 See, e.g., ADL Report: Anti-Semitic Targeting of Journalists During the 
2016 Presidential Campaign, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE 1 (Oct. 19, 2016), 
https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/press-
center/CR_4862_Journalism-Task-Force_v2.pdf [hereinafter ADL Report]; 
Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Tackles Rising Threat: Americans Aping Russian 
Schemes to Deceive, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/technology/fake-news-online-
disinformation.html. 
4 For the definition of “social media platform,” see infra notes 15–21 and 
accompanying text. 
5 See infra Section I.B. 
6 See infra Section I.B. 
7 Compare Benjamin F. Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of Expression in 
the Age of Facebook, 44 N.M. L. REV. 121, 127 (2014) (“[S]ocial network 
websites face external and internal pressures to censor content or block particular 
users’ access, a troubling situation given the importance social network websites 
have assumed in contemporary social and political life.”), with Vera Eidelman, 
Facebook Shouldn’t Censor Offensive Speech, ACLU (July 20, 2018), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/internet-speech/facebook-shouldnt-
censor-offensive-speech (“If Facebook gives itself broader censorship powers, it 
will inevitably take down important speech and silence already marginalized 
voices.”). 
8 See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
3
Hooker: Censorship, Free Speech & Facebook: Applying the First Amendment
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2019
 
2019]  CENSORSHIP, FREE SPEECH, & FACEBOOK 39 
 
the Supreme Court has carved out exceptions to this doctrine, 
holding that in some situations a private actor may be treated as a 
state actor, such as when an entity serves a “public function.”9 
Courts have held that online service providers, including social 
media platforms, are not state actors, giving platforms substantial 
latitude in regulating content.10 
This Article will consider the merits of extending the public 
function exception to encompass social media platforms by 
examining why such a change would be harmful as a matter of 
policy and legal principle. Part I discusses the role of social media 
in modern society and how platforms regulate content. Part II 
examines the First Amendment and the state action doctrine. Part III 
delves into commentary on the legal and social merits of bringing 
platforms under the restrictions of the First Amendment. Finally, 
Part IV weighs the merits of finding that such platforms fit within 
the definition of state action, explaining why it is a legally unstable 
approach that would grant the internet an improper pedestal in the 
eyes of the law. 
 
I. OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS 
 
A.  Social Media Platforms in Modern Society 
To say the internet is an important part of modern life is an 
understatement. Social media platforms have recently become 
central to everyday life. In 2018, approximately seven out of every 
ten Americans used social media “to connect with one another, 
engage with news content, share information and entertain 
themselves.”11 Considering that one in twenty Americans used 
social media in 2005,12 the adoption rate of these technologies is 
staggering. Moreover, around seventy-five percent of Facebook 
users and sixty percent of Instagram users visit these sites at least 
                                                 
9 See infra notes 68–79 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 63–67, 80–93 and accompanying text. 
11 Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/. 
12 Id. 
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once a day.13 Internet use is “near ubiquitous.”14 
The term “social media” lacks a concrete definition.15 
Dictionaries define it generally. For example, Merriam-Webster 
uses the definition, “forms of electronic communication . . . through 
which users create online communities to share information, ideas, 
personal messages, and other content.”16 The term is used broadly 
in common language. “Social media” is often used as an umbrella 
term to refer to specific platforms, like Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, Snapchat, and LinkedIn, with little consideration for 
what characteristics actually make them social media platforms.17 
For purposes of this Article, I will adopt Carr & Hayes’ proposed 
definition of social media: “Internet-based channels that allow users 
to opportunistically interact and selectively self-present, either in 
real-time or asynchronously, with both broad and narrow audiences 
who derive value from user-generated content and the perception of 
interaction with others.”18 Social media platforms are particularly 
distinguished by their interactivity component and the value they 
derive from user-generated content.19 This definition encompasses 
websites like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Yelp.20 It does not 
extend to websites providing services like email and online news, or 
to websites like Wikipedia, Skype, or Netflix.21 
                                                 
13 Id. 
14 Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/. 
15 See Caleb T. Carr & Rebecca A. Hayes, Social Media: Defining, 
Developing, and Divining, 23 ATLANTIC J. COMM. 46, 46–47 (2015). 
16 Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, INC., https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited Nov. 12, 2018); see also 
Social Media, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/social-media (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2018) (defining social media as “websites and computer programs that 
allow people to communicate and share information on the internet using a 
computer or mobile phone.”). 
17 See Carr & Hayes, supra note 15, at 46–49; Social Media Use in 2018, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-
use-in-2018/. 
18 Carr & Hayes, supra note 15, at 50. 
19 See id. at 51–52. 
20 Id. at 53. 
21 Id. 
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While social media platforms were initially started to serve a 
social purpose,22 they now serve numerous roles in society. 
President Trump uses Twitter to make official statements, and the 
National Archives requires that his tweets be archived under the 
Presidential Records Act.23 Facebook is a go-to source for news.24 
Newsrooms and journalists rely on Twitter to track and disseminate 
information.25 Social media sites are a vital part of the art 
community, enabling artists to reach broader audiences and 
providing a new creative medium.26 Social media gives the average 
person with internet access the ability to reach just as many readers 
as any major news source.27 In the words of Twitter’s CEO, 
“[p]eople do see us as a digital public square.”28 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Kathleen Chaykowski, Mark Zuckerberg Gives Facebook a New 
Mission, FORBES (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenchaykowski/2017/06/22/mark-
zuckerberg-gives-facebook-a-new-mission/ (noting that, according to Mark 
Zuckerberg, Facebook “was built to accomplish a social mission — to make the 
world more open and connected.”). 
23 See Lincoln Caplan, Should Facebook and Twitter be Regulated Under the 
First Amendment?, WIRED (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/should-
facebook-and-twitter-be-regulated-under-the-first-amendment/. 
24 See Matt Taibbi, Taibbi: Beware the Slippery Slope of Facebook 
Censorship, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 2, 2018), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/facebook-censor-alex-
jones-705766/ (“70 percent of Americans get their news from just two sources, 
Facebook and Google.”). 
25 See Peter Suderman, The Slippery Slope of Regulating Social Media, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/opinion/the-
slippery-slope-of-regulating-social-media.html. 
26 See Carolina A. Miranda, Social Media Have Become a Vital Tool for 
Artists — But Are They Good for Art?, L.A. TIMES (June 23, 2016), 
https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/miranda/la-et-cam-is-social-media-
good-for-art-20160517-snap-htmlstory.html (“[T]he advent of social media has 
transformed the ways in which artists interact with each other, their public and the 
institutions that govern their careers. . . . Services such as Facebook and Instagram 
have come to be regarded as essential spaces . . . .”). 
27 See Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in 
the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211, 211 (2017). 
28 Cecilia Kang & Sheera Frenkel, Republicans Accuse Twitter of Bias 
Against Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), 
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B.  Social Media Platforms’ Content Regulation Policies 
Unfortunately, but predictably, social media platforms are not 
immune from objectionable content, ranging from the controversial 
to the outright illegal. This content includes, but is not limited to, 
hate speech,29 “fake news,”30 harassment,31 and revenge 
pornography.32 In response, most platforms use “community 
guidelines” to regulate posted content. For example, Instagram 
states that its Community Guidelines exist to “create a safe and open 
environment for everyone.”33 The guidelines prohibit content like 
hate speech, nudity, and “[s]erious threats of harm.”34 In contrast, 
Twitter permits “[s]ome forms of graphic violence, adult content, or 
hateful imagery” as long as the tweets are marked as sensitive.35 
Moreover, these content regulations have teeth. In September 
2018, Twitter permanently banned Alex Jones, creator of Infowars, 
                                                 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/technology/lawmakers-facebook-twitter-
foreign-influence-hearing.html. 
29 See, e.g., Sheera Frenkel et al., On Instagram, 11,696 Examples of How 
Hate Thrives on Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/technology/hate-on-social-media.html; 
ADL Report, supra note 3. 
30 See, e.g., Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Tackles Rising Threat: Americans 
Aping Russian Schemes to Deceive, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/technology/fake-news-online-
disinformation.html. 
31 See, e.g., Aaron Smith & Maeve Duggan, Crossing the Line: What Counts 
as Online Harassment?, PEW RES. CTR. 2 (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.pewinternet.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/9/2018/01/PI_2018.01.04_Online-Harassment-
Scenarios_FINAL.pdf. 
32 See, e.g., Mary Anne Franks, Drafting An Effective “Revenge Porn” Law: 
A Guide for Legislators (Aug. 17, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2468823; 
Andrew Koppelman, Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions, 65 
EMORY L.J. 661, 661 (2016). 
33 Community Guidelines, INSTAGRAM, INC., 
https://help.instagram.com/477434105621119 (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). 
34 Id. 
35 Twitter Media Policy, TWITTER, INC., https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-
and-policies/media-policy (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). But such content may not 
appear in “live video, header, or profile images.” Id. 
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a right-wing conspiracy theorist website.36 Twitter noted that Mr. 
Jones’ posts had violated the platform’s “Abusive Behavior” policy, 
which prohibits “targeted harassment.”37  
Some believe that these policies are applied arbitrarily. For 
example, Instagram shut down a photographer’s account after she 
posted a photo of a naked model, even though the model’s breasts 
were censored with a leaf to avoid violation of the site’s standards.38 
Facebook removed the same photo from its platform.39 In a display 
of arbitrariness, Instagram deleted a post of a 1992 poem advocating 
for LGBT rights because the poem violated community standards, 
possibly because it contained words such as “dyke” and “fag.”40 In 
protest, various users reposted the poem; some of the reposts were 
removed, but others were not, even though the content was 
identical.41 Later, Instagram restored the original post.42 These 
incidents demonstrate the challenges platforms face in accurately 
and consistently applying content regulations and guidelines.43 
                                                 
36 See Kate Conger & Jack Nicas, Twitter Bars Alex Jones and Infowars, 
Citing Harassing Messages, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/technology/twitter-alex-jones-
infowars.html. 
37 Abusive Behavior, TWITTER, INC., https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-
policies/abusive-behavior (last visited Oct. 15, 2018); see also Conger & Nicas, 
supra note 36. 
38 José Da Silva, Instagram Deletes Photographer Dragana Jurisic’s Account 
and Facebook Censors Her Work, THE ART NEWSPAPER (May 14, 2018), 
https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/photographer-dragana-jurisic-has-
instagram-account-closed-down-and-work-censored-on-facebook. 
39 Id. 
40 Hanna Kozlowska, Why Is Instagram Censoring a 1992 Poem Revered by 
the LGBTQ Community?, QUARTZ (Jan 26, 2018), https://qz.com/1190263/why-
is-instagram-censoring-zoe-leonards-poem-from-1992/. Instagram only stated the 
post “violat[ed] community standards.” Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. Instagram said it was “taken down by mistake.” Id. 
43 See also Julia Jacobs, Will Instagram Ever ‘Free the Nipple’?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/arts/design/instagram-
free-the-nipple.html; Tracy Jan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, A White Man Called Her 
Kids the N-word. Facebook Stopped Her from Sharing It., WASH. POST (July 31, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/for-facebook-
erasing-hate-speech-proves-a-daunting-challenge/2017/07/31/922d9bc6-6e3b-
11e7-9c15-177740635e83_story.html?utm_term=.42ceb51a8c2c. 
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Perhaps the most well-known example of a controversial “take 
down” was Facebook’s removal of a Pulitzer Prize-winning 1972 
photograph of a naked, nine-year-old girl running from a napalm 
bombing in the Vietnam War.44 After a massive backlash, Facebook 
restored the photo but also maintained that such a photo was 
presumed to violate its standards.45 Yet the photo contained no 
sexual connotations and instead represented a newsworthy, tragic, 
and historical moment.46 
Not all controversial content regulation has been as obvious. 
Social media platforms have been accused of political bias resulting 
in censorship of certain political viewpoints.47 Lawmakers have 
suggested that Facebook has censored conservative voices on the 
site,48 and more generally, seventy-two percent of Americans 
believe that companies like Facebook and Twitter “actively censor 
political views.”49 Facebook kept its guidelines secret for some time, 
but recently published its internal Community Guidelines.50 Some 
platforms even utilize proprietary algorithms, which in turn has led 
to accusations that these algorithms favor certain news organizations 
and political viewpoints over others.51 The extent and impact of the 
                                                 
44 Mark Scott & Mike Isaac, Facebook Restores Iconic Vietnam War Photo 
It Censored for Nudity, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/technology/facebook-vietnam-war-photo-
nudity.html. 
45 Id. Facebook suggested the photo might “even qualify as child 
pornography” in some countries. Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See, e.g., Joan E. Solsman & Richard Nieva, Twitter ‘Censorship’ Still an 
Obsession for Congress as Hearing Gets Political, CNET.COM (Sep. 5, 2018), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/twitter-censorship-still-an-obsession-for-congress-
as-hearing-gets-political/. 
48 Id. 
49 Riley Griffin, Most Americans Think Facebook and Twitter Censor Their 
Political Views, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-28/most-americans-think-
social-media-giants-censor-their-views. 
50 Emma Woollacott, Facebook Reveals Its Secret Rules For Censoring 
Posts, FORBES (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2018/04/24/facebook-reveals-its-
secret-rules-for-censoring-posts/#49150c2c56da. 
51 See Derek Ruths & Jürgen Pfeffer, Social Media for Large Studies of 
Behavior, 346 SCIENCE 1063, 1063 (2014); Taibbi, supra note 24; see also 
9
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implementation of these algorithms are unclear.52 
Considering how social media platforms have enhanced 
communication and provided alternative avenues for important 
messages, content policies may threaten and stifle the types of 
speech that made these platforms important to begin with. Social 
media platforms call themselves “digital public square[s].”53 But 
they impose far more rules than traditional public squares.54 
 
II. CENSORSHIP, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND STATE ACTION 
 
A.  The Right to Censor and the State Action Doctrine 
  
While social media platforms may be subject to criticism and 
complaints of bias and arbitrariness in the application of content 
regulations, the First Amendment currently provides no recourse. 
The First Amendment states that, “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”55 This clause 
distinguishes the United States from most other nations due to the 
heightened value placed on protecting a wide variety of speech and 
expression56 as compared to other values.57 Essentially, “the 
                                                 
Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook is Rating the Trustworthiness of its Users on a 
Scale from Zero to 1, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/08/21/facebook-is-rating-
trustworthiness-its-users-scale-zero-one/. 
52 See Ruths & Pfeffer, supra note 51, at 1063. 
53 Kang & Frenkel, supra note 28; see also Community Standards: 
Introduction, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/introduction (last visited Oct. 
22, 2018). 
54 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983). 
55 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
56 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971) (holding that 
wearing a “Fuck the Draft” jacket was not conduct justifying criminal conviction); 
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (holding a statute could not prohibit 
trademark registration on the basis the mark might be disparaging); Street v. New 
York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (“[T]he public expression of ideas may not be 
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive . . . .”). 
57 See FLOYD ABRAMS, THE SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT xv (2017) 
(“The exceptionalism of the United States in the protections it offers . . . does not 
10
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government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”58 As 
Justice Harlan so memorably put it, “one man’s vulgarity is 
another’s lyric.”59 
But the First Amendment’s protections have a substantial limit 
because the Constitution generally serves as a check on the 
government but not on private entities.60 As a general rule, under the 
state action doctrine, the First Amendment applies only when the 
“censorship” or invasion on the freedom of speech is an act by the 
government.61 Under certain circumstances, a private actor may be 
held to be a state actor and therefore subject to constitutional 
restrictions.62 But courts have consistently held that online service 
providers of various kinds are not state actors, even when First 
Amendment issues are at stake.63 For example, courts have held that 
AOL is not a state actor subject to the First Amendment.64 The trend 
                                                 
mean that other democratic nations do not respect, honor, and generally seek to 
protect it; it does mean that American law does so more often, more intensely, and 
more controversially than is true elsewhere.”). 
58 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
59 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25; see also id. at 26 (“[W]e cannot indulge the facile 
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial 
risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”). 
60 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
61 See id.; Bronner v. Duggan, 249 F. Supp. 3d 27, 41 (D.D.C. 2017) (“To 
trigger First Amendment protection, the infringement upon speech must have 
arisen from state action of some kind.”). State action arises in the context of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and applies the First Amendment to the states through the 
incorporation doctrine. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); The 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10–11. 
62 See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 
288, 296 (2001) (discussing various doctrines under which a private entity may 
be a state actor, such as state control, public function, and sufficient entwinement). 
63 See, e.g., Green v. America Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 
2003); Estavillo v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am., No. C-09-03007 RMW, 2009 WL 
3072887 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2009); Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 
2d 532, 546 (E.D. Va. 2003); Island Online, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 119 
F. Supp. 2d 289, 307 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, 
Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
64 See Green, 318 F.3d at 472; Noah, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 546; Cyber 
Promotions, Inc., 948 F. Supp. at 445. 
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has also extended to a private domain name registrant65 and to 
Sony’s PlayStation 3 Network.66 Most importantly, Facebook is no 
exception.67 
 
B.  The Public Function Exception to the State Action Doctrine 
  
Of the possible exceptions to state action, the public function 
exception is most relevant to social media platforms.68 In Marsh v. 
Alabama, the Supreme Court held that a private, company-owned 
town was a state actor because the town’s operation was “essentially 
a public function.”69 Significant to the Court’s rationale was the 
principle that “[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his 
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights 
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of 
those who use it.”70 The Court even went so far as to assert that in 
balancing the rights of property owners with other persons’ First 
Amendment rights, “the latter occupy a preferred position.”71 Thus, 
when a facility is “built and operated primarily to benefit the public” 
and when its “operation is essentially a public function,” state action 
exists.72 Twenty years later in Evans v. Newton the Supreme Court 
relied on Marsh and held that a privately-owned park was subject to 
state action because of its “public character.”73 
The public function exception has been increasingly narrowed 
since Marsh and Evans. In 1968, the Supreme Court held a private 
                                                 
65 See Island Online, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 307. 
66 See Estavillo, 2009 WL 3072887. 
67 See Young v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:10–cv–03579–JF/PVT, 2010 WL 
4269304, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010) (dismissing plaintiff’s Section 1983 
First Amendment claim). 
68 See Jackson, supra note 7, at 142. 
69 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505–06 (1946); see also Jackson, supra 
note 7, at 143 (noting that Marsh “effectively treated the company-owned town 
like a state actor.”). 
70 Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507. 
71 Id. at 509; see also id. at 506 (“Ownership does not always mean absolute 
dominion.”). 
72 Id. at 506. 
73 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966). 
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shopping center was a state actor subject to the First Amendment.74 
But the Court quickly reversed track and subsequently overruled 
itself.75 In 1974, the Supreme Court limited public functions to “the 
exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively 
reserved to the State.”76 This exclusivity requirement was 
reaffirmed when the Supreme Court held a private school did not 
fall under the public function exception because, while education 
was arguably a public function, it was not within “the exclusive 
province of the State.”77 The Second Circuit backed away from a 
pure exclusivity requirement in 2004, stating the function must have 
traditionally been an “exclusive, or near exclusive, function of the 
State.”78 But even with a more flexible standard, the court refused 
to hold that a library met the exception.79 
Not only has the public function exception been narrowed, but 
it has also been rejected with respect to online service providers. For 
example, in 1996, a federal district court ruled that AOL “exercises 
absolutely no powers which are in any way the prerogative, let alone 
the exclusive prerogative, of the State.”80 In that case, the plaintiff 
argued that AOL, as a provider of email services, performed a public 
function because the email services were free, open to the public, 
and a place “where public discourse, conversations and commercial 
transactions can and do take place.”81 But the district court refused 
to analogize AOL to the company town in Marsh, ruling that 
providing those services was “not an exercise of any municipal 
power or public service that was traditionally exercised by the 
                                                 
74 See Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 
391 U.S. 308, 316–20 (1968). 
75 See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 562–64 (1972) (limiting Logan 
Valley but declining to overrule it); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976) 
(holding that Lloyd Corp. and Logan Valley were incompatible and explicitly 
stating that Lloyd Corp. did in fact overrule Logan Valley). 
76 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (emphasis added). 
77 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (emphasis added). 
78 Horvath v. Westport Library Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(emphasis added). 
79 Id. at 152. 
80 Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 441 
(E.D. Pa. 1996). 
81 Id. at 442. 
13
Hooker: Censorship, Free Speech & Facebook: Applying the First Amendment
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2019
 
2019]  CENSORSHIP, FREE SPEECH, & FACEBOOK 49 
 
State.”82 Although this case is now over twenty years old, the 
holding is emblematic of the continuing trend against attributing 
state action to online providers.83 
The Supreme Court’s most recent discussion of the public 
function exception in the First Amendment context focused heavily 
on the exclusivity requirement. In Manhattan Community Access 
Corp. v. Halleck, the Court held that the operation of public access 
cable channels was not a “traditional, exclusive public function.”84 
The Court emphasized that “‘very few’ functions fall into” the 
public function category.85 It then proceeded to list numerous 
functions that do not fit the exception: “running sports associations 
and leagues, administering insurance payments, operating nursing 
homes, providing special education, representing indigent criminal 
defendants, resolving private disputes, and supplying electricity.”86 
But in this case, the channels were operated by a private nonprofit.87 
The Court observed that because public access channels have 
historically been operated by both public and private entities, such 
operation “is not a traditional, exclusive public function within the 
meaning of this Court’s cases.”88 
But the Court went even further. It rejected the notion that the 
“function” at issue was not simply operation of public access cable, 
but instead operation of “a public forum for speech.”89 In reasoning 
that could be considered somewhat circular, the Court pointed out 
that when a private entity provides a forum for speech, it is not 
subject to the First Amendment because it is not a state actor.90 In 
fact, the Court asserted, it is a “commonsense principle” that 
providing an open forum for speech is not an activity that only 
governments have traditionally performed.91 “In short, merely 
                                                 
82 Id. 
83 See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
84 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019). 
85 Id. at 1929. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1926. 
88 Id. at 1929–30. 
89 Id. at 1930. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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hosting speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive public 
function and does not alone transform private entities into state 
actors subject to First Amendment constraints.”92 The Court thus 
recognized a constitutional principle that private property owners— 
even in the digital space—have editorial discretion within the 
bounds of their property.93 Such reasoning seems to foreclose the 
possibility of recognizing social media platforms as state actors 
under current precedent and the legal landscape. As private entities, 
social media platforms fit well within the Court’s description of a 
private actor that simply opens up its property for speech. And as 
the Court noted, such an act is not enough to find there was state 
action to meet the exception. 
 
III. COMMENTARY AND CRITICISM 
 
A.  Calls to Embrace Free Speech 
 
Within the realms of law, politics, and society, opinions differ 
on the merits and the legal and social implications of social media 
content regulation. Moreover, even the starting points for some of 
these analyses vary. For instance, some authors have focused on the 
possible merits of stemming the tide of fake news and online 
harassment on social media.94 In contrast, others have concentrated 
on mechanics over merits, looking at how rather than why the First 
Amendment can be applied to these private actors.95 
The ACLU has characterized Facebook as having a “nearly 
unparalleled status as a forum for political speech and debate,” 
arguing that the platform should not remove anything except 
                                                 
92 Id.; see also id. (“As Judge Jacobs persuasively explained, it ‘is not at all a 
near-exclusive function of the state to provide the forums for public expression, 
politics, information, or entertainment.’” (quoting Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. 
Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2018) (Jacobs, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part))). 
93 Id. at 1931. 
94 See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 23; Danielle Keats Citron, Civil Rights in Our 
Information Age, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY AND 
REPUTATION 31, 38–46 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010). 
95 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 7, at 121–22;  
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“unlawful speech.”96 While acknowledging that a private company 
is not “technically bound” by the First Amendment, the organization 
has expressed grave concern over Facebook’s ability to moderate 
posts or serve as an “arbiter of truth versus misinformation.”97 
Notable about the ACLU’s standpoint is its depiction of Facebook 
as “a forum for the speech of billions of people.”98 The organization 
took it a step further, calling Facebook a “gatekeeper[] of the 
modern-day public square,”99 a phrase that harkens back to the 
“public function” language in Marsh.100 
Benjamin Jackson takes a similar position, arguing that even a 
“narrow conception” of the public function exception supports 
subjecting sites like Facebook to the First Amendment.101 He 
compares social network sites to “public squares and meeting 
places” in that both “provid[e] a space that has the primary purpose 
of serving as a forum for public communication and expression, that 
is designated for that purpose, and that is completely open to the 
public at large.”102 Jackson makes an intriguing argument to address 
the exclusivity requirement from Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co.; he suggests that although large, privately owned spaces have 
existed in the past, “they have rarely been dedicated to public speech 
or open to virtually all comers.”103 Thus, he argues, a large forum 
like Facebook that is dedicated to public speech provides “a service 
that was previously ‘exclusively’ provided by the State.”104 
 
B.  Apparent Challenges with the Marsh Exception 
  
In 1999, when the internet was a new phenomenon, the Harvard 
Law Review dedicated one of its annual Developments in the Law 
articles to “what the law of cyberspace could look like in the 
                                                 
96 Eidelman, supra note 7. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. (emphasis added). 
100 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946). 
101 Jackson, supra note 7, at 146. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 147. 
104 Id. But see infra Section IV.A. 
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future.”105 The article warns that “[a]bdicating cyberspace to 
proprietary interests—and rejecting the existence of public forums 
in cyberspace—may pose too great a threat to free speech.”106 The 
article also takes an intriguing position with respect to analogizing 
internet entities to the company town in Marsh. Marsh never 
actually used the phrase “state action” or “state actor.”107 Because 
Marsh dealt with enforcement of a state trespass law, the Court may 
have presumed state action but then “engage[d] in a substantive 
balancing of competing rights.”108 Thus, in the opinion of the 
Harvard Law Review, Marsh was not even a state action case.109 But 
that interpretation of Marsh is inherently and fundamentally flawed 
because the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized Marsh as a 
state action case.110 
Professor Tim Wu of Columbia Law School takes an extremely 
negative approach to using the First Amendment to protect free 
speech in the social media context, calling the First Amendment “a 
bystander in an age of aggressive efforts to propagandize and control 
online speech.”111 One of the bases for his claim is the state action 
doctrine.112 Wu distinguishes social media platforms from the 
company town in Marsh, pointing out that while platforms like 
Facebook may serve an important public function, “it seems much 
harder to say that they are acting like the government all but in 
                                                 
105 Developments in the Law: The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
1574, 1585 (1999) [hereinafter Developments]. 
106 Id. at 1603. 
107 Id. at 1629 n.120. 
108 Id.; see also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Sidewalks, Sewers, and State 
Action in Cyberspace, THE BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT 
HARV. U., https://cyber.harvard.edu/is02/readings/stateaction-shaffer-van-
houweling.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2018) (“Strangely, Marsh v. Alabama is 
viewed as a classic case in . . . [state action] jurisprudence, although the existence 
of state action in Marsh was so clear that Justice Black’s majority opinion does 
not even mention the requirement.”). 
109 See Developments, supra note 105, at 1628–29, 1629 nn.120–21. 
110 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). 
111 Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. 
(Sept. 1, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-
obsolete. 
112 Id. 
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name.”113 Wu properly warns that if the influence of a platform were 
sufficient to extend the public function exception, then the category 
would become far too large and undefinable: “If the major speech 
platforms . . . ought to be classified as state actors based not on the 
assumption of specific state-like duties but merely on their 
influence, it is hard to know where the category ends.”114 
Wu’s solution to online speech issues is unclear. He suggests the 
government could enact laws to address “improper” efforts to 
control speech online, all the while acknowledging that such laws 
would raise their own First Amendment problems.115 But in a direct 
response to Wu’s paper, Geoffrey Stone of the University of 
Chicago pushes back.116 He argues that because the Supreme Court 
has been willing to play “fast-and-loose” with state action in the 
past, it might do so again.117 However, Stone provides little 
justification for this assertation, only noting that “profound private 
threats to our system of free expression” might incentivize the Court 
to take action.118 
 
C.  The Right to Access Speech Platforms 
  
Even though the government has appeared at times to shy away 
from regulation of the internet and social media platforms,119 the 
Supreme Court recently appeared at least willing to consider the 
need for encouraging open access to social media sites.120 In 
Packingham v. North Carolina, state action was not the issue since 
                                                 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. The implications of state action on social media platforms’ First 
Amendment rights is beyond the scope of this Article. 
116 Geoffrey R. Stone, Reflections on Whether the First Amendment is 
Obsolete, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Nov. 1, 2017) 
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/reflections-whether-first-amendment-
obsolete. 
117 See id. 
118 Id. (Stone also suggests that Marsh might be a “good jumping off point” 
but fails to rebut any of Wu’s criticisms of analogizing social media platforms to 
company towns); see also Wu, supra note 111. 
119 See, e.g., infra notes 134–43 and accompanying text. 
120 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–37 (2017). 
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the Court was tasked with considering the constitutionality of a 
North Carolina statute preventing registered sex offenders from 
accessing social networking websites.121 But in the majority 
opinion, Justice Kennedy made bold statements regarding the 
importance of the internet in general. He affirmed that “social media 
in particular” is one of “the most important places (in a spatial sense) 
for the exchange of views.”122 Justice Kennedy described one of the 
First Amendment’s “fundamental principle[s]” as being that “all 
persons have access to places where they can speak and listen.”123 
Most notable about this statement is the Court’s apparent extension 
of the First Amendment right to speak to the right to have access to 
places to speak. Justice Kennedy later warned that “the Court must 
exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the First 
Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast networks in 
that medium.”124 Statements like these signal that the Court may be 
seeking ways to promote freedom of speech on the internet.125 
Similarly, in 1994, the Supreme Court considered a First 
Amendment challenge by cable companies to a statute requiring 
them to transmit local broadcast stations.126 Although the Court 
remanded the case for further consideration, the Court was 
concerned about the “potential for abuse of this private power over 
                                                 
121 Id. at 1734. 
122 Id. at 1735; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (referring 
to the internet as “vast democratic forums”). 
123 Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (emphasis added). 
124 Id. at 1736. 
125 Since Justice Kennedy has retired, it is left to be seen whether other 
justices will be willing to continue this ideology. See Michael D. Shear, Supreme 
Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-retire-
supreme-court.html. Notably, Justice Kennedy’s replacement, Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh, once argued that net neutrality regulations violate the First 
Amendment rights of online service providers because they restrict providers’ 
editorial discretion. See United States Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 
417–18 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also supra note 115 and 
accompanying text. So far on the Supreme Court bench, Justice Kavanaugh has 
already authored one opinion rejecting the public function exception. See supra 
notes 84–93 and accompanying text. 
126 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 626 (1994). 
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a central avenue of communication.”127 The Court noted there is 
value in “ensur[ing] that private interests not restrict, through 
physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free 
flow of information and ideas.”128 Again, state action was not at 
issue, but this case demonstrates the Court’s concern that the public 
have unimpeded access to information, even when the platform is 
maintained by a private entity. Also, the Court did not immediately 
strike the statute as violative of the First Amendment even though 
the statute directly affected cable companies’ discretion as to what 
content they provided.129 Thus, this position, along with the position 
in Packingham,130 suggests that the Supreme Court might be willing 
to treat social media platforms as a public function. Using phrases 
like “critical pathway of communication”131 and “most important 
places . . . for the exchange of views”132 is a good start.133 
 
D.  Policy Considerations 
  
Congress has demonstrated reluctance to attribute liability to 
online platforms in other legal spheres. The most prevalent example 
is 47 U.S.C. § 230, which immunizes websites from liability for 
third-party content.134 In doing so, Congress recognized that “[t]he 
Internet . . . offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and 
myriad avenues for intellectual activity,” and that the internet has 
                                                 
127 Id. at 657. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 668. 
130 See supra notes 119–25 and accompanying text. 
131 Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 657. 
132 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
133 See also Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and 
Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1611 (2018) 
(suggesting that Packingham “might breathe new life into the application of state 
action doctrine to internet platforms”). But see supra notes 84–93 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Court’s latest discussion on the public function 
exception—and rejection of the doctrine for public cable access—in Manhattan 
Community Access Corp. v. Halleck). 
134 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012); see also Eric Goldman, The Ten Most 
Important Section 230 Rulings, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 1–2 (2017). 
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“flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of 
government regulation.”135 Section 230 has been characterized as 
providing “the legal foundation for the Internet we know and love 
the most.”136 Among other things, the statute protects websites from 
being liable for moderating third-party content, including a 
website’s decision on what content to publish, edit, or remove.137 In 
fact, Section 230 may even serve to reduce website censorship, since 
websites can be less concerned with liability for what they do or do 
not permit.138 
Social media platforms are covered by Section 230’s 
immunity.139 In other words, Section 230 appears to protect social 
media platforms from many legal claims and causes of action that 
the First Amendment (through state action) would otherwise hold 
them responsible for.140 The statute serves to protect social media 
platforms’ editorial discretion.141 Of course, if state action was 
                                                 
135 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3)–(4). 
136 Goldman, supra note 134, at 2. 
137 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 
332–33 (1997); Goldman, supra note 134, at 3. 
138 See Note, Section 230 As First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2027, 
2027 (2018) (“This intermediary liability protection encourages websites to 
engage in content moderation without fear that their efforts to screen content will 
expose them to liability for defamatory material that slips through. Without this 
protection, websites would have an incentive to censor constitutionally protected 
speech in order to avoid potential lawsuits.”). 
139 Section 230’s immunity only extends if the service provider is not also 
functioning as an “information content provider” (ICP). Fair Hous. Council of San 
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008). 
An ICP is a provider “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). When platforms 
regulate user-generated content, they are likely protected by Section 230. See 
Roomates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162–64 (distinguishing between displaying third-
party content and actually contributing to content creation); see also Klayman v. 
Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357–60 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding Facebook 
immunized by Section 230); Perkins v. Linkedin Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1222, 
1246–49 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding LinkedIn not protected by Section 230 as to 
its generation of emails). 
140 Section 230 often arises with tort liability, but “creates . . . immunity to 
any cause of action.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see also Roomates.com, 521 F.3d at 
1164 (considering Section 230 immunity in the context of a civil rights claim). 
141 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
21
Hooker: Censorship, Free Speech & Facebook: Applying the First Amendment
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2019
 
2019]  CENSORSHIP, FREE SPEECH, & FACEBOOK 57 
 
attributed to social media platforms, the First Amendment’s 
protections would trump any statute, including Section 230.142 
Nevertheless, Section 230’s history represents an important policy 
consideration, namely that the internet has thrived because of the 
immunity and discretion granted to websites.143 Section 230 has 
demonstrated the benefits derived from protecting online providers, 
rather than opening them to liability. 
Professor Richard Epstein has cautioned against stretching 
existing legal principles to fit the internet.144 Although 
acknowledging that some principles “may need a bit of tweaking,” 
he posits that if they were sound at their inception, then they should 
suffice now.145 The internet may create tension between property 
rights and the First Amendment, but Epstein argues this is nothing 
new compared to traditional tensions.146 “There is less novelty here 
than meets the eye.”147 Just because a technology involves the 
“control and dissemination of information” does not mean the First 
Amendment must play a role, since the First Amendment does not 
necessarily trump property rights.148 But Epstein’s view may not be 
entirely accurate. In 1969, the Supreme Court suggested that “[i]t is 
                                                 
142 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
143 Section 230 was recently amended to exclude from immunity websites 
engaged in certain acts related to sex trafficking. See Allow States and Victims to 
Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, 132 Stat. 1253 (2017) (codified in part 
at 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)). The amendment is the subject of substantial controversy, 
including a constitutional challenge. See, e.g., Woodhull Freedom Found. v. 
United States, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-5298 
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 12, 2018); Eric Goldman, Sex Trafficking Exceptions to Section 
230 (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Papers Series, No. 
2017-13, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3038632; Emily Stewart, The Next Big 
Battle Over Internet Freedom Is Here, VOX (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/23/17237640/fosta-sesta-
section-230-internet-freedom. 
144 See Richard Epstein, The Irrelevance of the First Amendment to the 
Modern Regulation of the Internet, 23 COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST & UNFAIR 
COMPETITION L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 100, 100 (2014). 
145 Id. at 111; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the 
Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996). 
146 Epstein, supra note 144, at 102. 
147 Id. at 111. 
148 Id. at 100–01, 111. 
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the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas . . . rather than to countenance monopolization 
of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private 
licensee.”149 If the Court formerly entertained the notion of the First 
Amendment trumping other private property rights, it might do so 
again.150 
Another caveat comes from Peter Suderman, who warns against 
placing too much value in social media.151 While acknowledging 
that it is unsurprising that the rise of social media has been followed 
by calls for regulation of the content on those platforms, he asserts 
that regulation would damage how people view speech itself.152 In 
Suderman’s view, embracing regulation is, at its core, “a view that 
speech . . . is not an individual right, but a collective good that 
should be subject to political control.”153 Thus, it is more important 
for citizens to take responsibility for their own social media 
consumption rather than impose regulations on others.154 Suderman 
specifically argues against government involvement in regulation 
but also appears opposed to forcing platforms to be completely open 
and unregulated.155 Suderman’s solution is to keep the government 
                                                 
149 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (emphasis added). 
While the Court was specifically addressing the fairness doctrine here, the Court’s 
willingness to make this statement is noteworthy. See id. (“It is the right of the 
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”). 
The FCC subsequently withdrew the fairness doctrine based on its own position 
the doctrine was unconstitutional. See In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 
5043, 5057–58 (1987); see also Thomas W. Hazlett et al., The Overly Active 
Corpse of Red Lion, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 51, 51 (2010) (calling Red 
Lion “fatally flawed.”). 
150 See supra notes 70–72, 119–29 and accompanying text. 
151 Suderman, supra note 25; see also infra notes 200–04 and accompanying 
text; cf. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General 
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1015–16 (2010) (arguing that while the 
internet may require new rules in certain contexts, “the role of the Constitution 
should remain constant regardless of technology.”); Joseph H. Sommer, Against 
Cyberlaw, 15 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1149 (2000) (“To risk a metaphor from 
another technology, the Internet can be an excellent lens for seeing other things. 
It is not, however, a particularly useful focal plane of legal analysis.”). 
152 See Suderman, supra note 25. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. (“Social media corporations, as private entities, have the right to ban 
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out of regulation of platforms entirely and to simply allow them to 
regulate themselves.156 
Professor Ari Ezra Waldman provided a thought-provoking 
defense of social media platforms’ content regulation in a written 
statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
the Judiciary.157 Waldman compared social media platforms to 
traditional media platforms, which have editorial discretion to 
control what is published.158 According to Waldman, content 
regulations provide structure; without regulations, “[i]t would just 
be spectacle, and really bad, cacophonous, headache-inducing 
spectacle at that.”159 Even though internal content regulation may be 
imperfect, Waldman argued, it is better than nothing.160 Waldman 
also defended the systems employed to regulate content, stating that 
the “top level moderation happens back at headquarters, by lawyers 
directly responsible for content moderation policies and training.”161 
His implication seems to be that since these moderators “are trained 
to exercise judgment based on rules set out by the platforms,” users 
should just trust them.162 Without citing any specific authority, he 
also asserted that the policies “reflect . . . free speech norms.”163 
Ultimately, though, Waldman’s overall attitude toward social 
media platforms is somewhat unclear, given that he proceeded to 
                                                 
anyone, for any or no reason.”). 
156 See id. 
157 Filtering Practices of Social Media Platforms: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 2 (2018) (written statement of Ari Ezra 
Waldman, Professor of Law, New York Law School), 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20180426/108231/HHRG-115-JU00-
Wstate-WaldmanA-20180426.pdf [hereinafter Filtering Practices]. 
158 See id. at 3–4 (“Neither Salon nor the National Review can publish 
everything.”). 
159 Id. at 4; see also Emma Grey Ellis & Louise Matsakis, Diamond and Silk 
Expose Facebook’s Burden of Moderation, WIRED (Apr. 14, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/diamond-and-silk-expose-facebooks-burden-of-
moderation/ (pointing out that “to communicate anything, Facebook can’t 
communicate everything.”). 
160 See Filtering Practices, supra note 157, at 5. 
161 Id. at 4. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
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transition into criticism of Facebook’s privacy policies and data 
protection.164 Irrespective of Waldman’s “just trust them” view as 
to content regulation, he makes a valid point with respect to the role 
Facebook plays in society: “[W]e don’t have a First Amendment 
right to Facebook’s amplification of our words.”165 But even this 
assertion is called into question in light of Justice Kennedy’s 
discussion on how access to places to speak is part of the First 
Amendment’s protections.166 If First Amendment rights include 
access to opportunities to speak, and if social media platforms are 
so powerful in amplifying our speech, then perhaps a person should 
have the right to access and speak on social media.  
 
IV. WEIGHING THE MERITS OF FINDING STATE ACTION 
  
This Part will explore the chances and merits of finding that 
social media platforms are state actors under the public function 
exception. As will be discussed, courts should not find that these 
platforms fit the public function exception, both as a matter of law 
and as a matter of policy. This Part will first consider the problems 
with attributing state action to social media platforms, and then will 
explore alternative regulation methods. 
 
A.  The Public Function Exception 
  
As an initial matter, social media platforms may bear some 
resemblance to the company town in Marsh v. Alabama. Social 
media platforms open up their service for public use, just like the 
company town in Marsh opened up its private property for public 
use.167 But the challenge is identifying the specific public function 
                                                 
164 Id. at 6–7 (“[A]lthough the evidence isn’t there to suggest a systemic bias 
when it comes to content moderation, there is evidence that Facebook . . . cares 
very little about . . . our data.”). 
165 Id. at 4. 
166 See supra notes 119–25 and accompanying text. 
167 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946) (Whether a website, existing 
purely on the internet, can be fairly analogized to a physical space, like a town, is 
another intriguing issue beyond the scope of this Article). See generally Dan 
Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. 
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that social media platforms serve. Benjamin Jackson accurately 
notes that social media platforms serve a function of providing a 
forum for communication and expression.168 But that function is not 
uniquely public.169 Outside the online realm, various entities provide 
large venues for the exchange of information, such as newspapers 
and libraries.170 Those entities can be private or public, and the 
private entities are not state actors.171 Thus, there is no tradition that 
venues for communication and expression are operated by the State. 
The analogy is further weakened because, even though some such 
venues may be public, many of those venues have been traditionally 
private.172 Therefore, this is not an area where the function has been 
an “exclusive, or near exclusive,”173 state function. Moreover, even 
though a social media platform may have a governing body for its 
users, that fact alone is insufficient to attribute state action to the 
platform.174 
                                                 
L. REV. 521 (2003). 
168 Jackson, supra note 7, at 146; see also supra notes 15–21 and 
accompanying text (discussing the definition of the term “social media”). 
169 See, e.g., supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text. 
170 See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 
(2019) (“After all, private property owners and private lessees often open their 
property for speech. Grocery stores put up community bulletin boards. Comedy 
clubs host open mic nights.”). 
171 See, e.g., Assocs. & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 134–
36 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that a newspaper was not a state actor); Horvath v. 
Westport Library Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a library 
does not perform a public function). 
172 For example, Benjamin Franklin “provided library services to the citizens 
of Philadelphia two hundred and fifty years ago.” Horvath, 362 F.3d at 152. 
Private libraries still exist, like those in universities. See, e.g., Professional Center 
Library: About, WAKE FOREST U., http://library.law.wfu.edu/about/ (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2018) (noting that “[t]he Wake Forest University Professional Center 
Library is a private academic library.”). Newspapers are also not state-run. See, 
e.g., Paul Farhi, Washington Post to be Sold to Jeff Bezos, the Founder of Amazon, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/washington-post-to-be-sold-to-jeff-
bezos/2013/08/05/ca537c9e-fe0c-11e2-9711-3708310f6f4d_story.html. 
173 Horvath, 362 F.3d at 151. 
174 For a discussion of the most recent iteration of the Court’s articulation of 
this principle, see supra notes 84–93 and accompanying text. See also Orin S. 
Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 395 (2003) 
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B.  Negative Consequences 
  
Even if the public function exception could be extended to social 
media platforms, the broader, more fundamental question is whether 
it should be extended. Such an extension would be inappropriate as 
a matter of policy. Further, such an extension would be an 
inappropriate legal doctrine.175 
 
1. A Free For All on Social Media 
  
At first glance, the consequences of finding social media 
platforms to be state actors are extremely appealing. With the state 
action requirement satisfied, social media users could invoke their 
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, thus preserving the 
“uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”176 In fact, a prospective plaintiff 
would have two methods for asserting those First Amendment 
rights: both (1) a claim for equitable relief under the Fourteenth 
Amendment,177 and (2) a claim for civil relief under Section 1983.178 
                                                 
(“While Marsh remains good law, the Supreme Court generally has rejected the 
Marsh approach when a private entity ‘seemed’ like the government only to 
specific individuals encountering the entity in the context of a specific 
relationship.”). 
175 One tremendous consequence of treating social media platforms as state 
actors is that state action is not just a First Amendment doctrine. For example, if 
an entity is a state actor, then it is subject to not only the First Amendment but 
also the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole. See supra note 61. Because this 
Article is focusing solely on First Amendment issues, the plethora of 
consequences outside of the First Amendment context are beyond the scope of 
this Article. Nonetheless, those consequences would be far-reaching and deserve 
extensive consideration. 
176 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (quoting FCC v. 
League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)). 
177 See supra note 61; Julie K. Brown, Less is More: Decluttering the State 
Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L. REV. 561, 564 (2008). 
178 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding 
for redress . . . .”); Brown, supra note 177, at 564. Although Section 1983, instead 
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Of course, not all speech or expression would be permissible. 
Even where the First Amendment applies, certain forms of speech 
may be prohibited.179 Consequently, social media sites could likely 
still prohibit traditionally unprotected speech, including language 
that incites illegal action,180 fighting words,181 obscenity,182 child 
pornography,183 and some forms of defamation.184 But negative 
consequences would follow. For example, Twitter would no longer 
be able to allow users to block other users, since that action would 
constitute an infringement on the blocked user’s ability to speak and 
have access to portions of the platform.185 Another example is hate 
speech. Hate speech is protected under the First Amendment.186 
Thus, ironically, platforms would be required to keep up much of 
the objectionable content (such as hate speech) that many have 
                                                 
of requiring state action, requires the defendant to have acted under color of state 
law, the presence of state action satisfies the color of law requirement. See Lugar 
v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982) (“If the challenged 
conduct . . . constitutes state action . . . then that conduct was also action under 
color of state law and will support a suit under § 1983.”). 
179 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (quoting R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S., 377, 382–83 (1992)) (noting that “the First 
Amendment has ‘permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few 
limited areas,’ and has never ‘include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional 
limitations.’”). 
180 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
181 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
182 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
183 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). 
184 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–46 (1974). 
185 A similar situation has already occurred, when President Donald Trump 
was prohibited from blocking Twitter followers who expressed views he 
disagreed with, because such blocking violated the First Amendment rights of the 
blocked users. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 
928 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 2019). Notably the court explicitly avoided considering 
“whether private social media companies are bound by the First Amendment 
when policing their platforms.” Id. 
186 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (“Speech that demeans 
on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar 
ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that 
we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” (quoting United 
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting))). 
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called for platforms to exercise more control over. 
Applying First Amendment protections would also raise new, 
complex questions about content regulation even within unprotected 
forms of speech. Under current First Amendment jurisprudence, the 
government cannot regulate a subcategory of speech according to 
different rules than those that apply to the larger category.187 For 
example, even though Facebook could prohibit fighting words,188 it 
would not be permitted to regulate some fighting words but allow 
others. Granting social media users the protections of the First 
Amendment would effectively tie the hands of social media 
platforms, inhibiting them from acting in an editorial function to 
engage in meaningful or helpful content curation or control.189 
 
2. Maintaining the Public/Private Distinction 
  
A further challenge to attributing state action to social media 
platforms is its interference with the line the Supreme Court has 
drawn, for better or for worse, between public and private actors.190 
This line is rooted in a respect for private autonomy and the proper 
                                                 
187 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992). 
188 See supra notes 180–85 and accompanying text. 
189 Editorial discretion is a central privilege to any private entity that opens 
up its forum to the public. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. 
Ct. 1921, 1930–31 (2019) (“If the rule were otherwise, all private property owners 
and private lessees who open their property for speech would be subject to First 
Amendment constraints and would lose the ability to exercise what they deem to 
be appropriate editorial discretion within that open forum.”). Newspapers’ 
editorial function has long been recognized as an important and protected 
privilege. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of 
Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241, 258 (1974); N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 265–66; supra notes 134–43 
(discussing Section 230’s protection of online providers’ editorial privilege).  
190 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged this line is not clear or 
consistent. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) 
(“Unfortunately, our cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of 
the state have not been a model of consistency.”). But the Court has insisted that 
the line does exist. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 
531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (“Our cases try to plot a line between state action subject 
to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny and private conduct (however exceptionable) 
that is not.”). 
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role of the judiciary.191 The public/private distinction recognizes 
that there are “some areas of life . . . where individual and 
associational decision-making must remain largely free from 
governmental control.”192 This distinction developed out of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and is more or less assumed, 
even taken for granted, in modern society.193 
While social media sites may be analogized to company towns, 
the two are fairly distinguishable.194 At its core, Facebook is a 
private website operated for commercial profit purposes. It may 
serve the public but so does a restaurant. Yet a restaurant is only 
subject to certain restrictions because Congress took legislative 
action.195 Absent such legislation, which is in the purview of 
Congress’ authority,196 constitutional restrictions should not be 
forced on social media platforms by stretching an already confusing 
and convoluted doctrine.197 While perhaps the public/private 
                                                 
191 See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (2001)) (noting 
there is a “judicial obligation” to “preserv[e] an area of individual freedom by 
limiting the reach of federal law”); Gerald Turkel, The Public/Private Distinction: 
Approaches to the Critique of Legal Ideology, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 801, 801 
(1988) (“The dichotomy appears necessary for individual autonomy, the 
maintenance of social institutions, and the conduct of legal action . . . .”). 
192 James M. Oleske, Jr., Doric Columns Are Not Falling: Wedding Cakes, 
the Ministerial Exception, and the Public-Private Distinction, 75 MD. L. REV. 
142, 145 (2015). 
193 See Morton J. Horwitzt, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 
U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1982); Oleske, supra note 192, at 144. 
194 See supra Section IV.A. 
195 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits certain discriminatory acts by 
“places of public accommodation,” including restaurants. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a), 
(b)(2) (2012). 
196 See Jackson, supra note 7, at 159 (“[A]s most social network websites are 
for-profit businesses that serve customers across state lines, it seems that Congress 
would have adequate Commerce Clause power to regulate at least some of the 
activities of social network websites.”); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 
89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 94 (2009) (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of 
Am., Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983)) (“[T]he Commerce Clause 
‘no doubt’ allow[s] Congress to proscribe private efforts to prevent the exercise 
of speech or rights secured only against state interference . . . .”). 
197 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal 
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) 
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distinction is actually a fiction or unwarranted as a matter of 
policy,198 there must be a better reason to remove this distinction 
than the simple fact that an entity exists online. As discussed in the 
next subsection, the internet need not and should not change all of 
the rules. 
 
3. Internet Exceptionalism 
  
Attributing state action to social media platforms elevates the 
internet to a position it should not hold, an act scholars have coined 
as “internet exceptionalism.”199 Fundamentally, social media 
platforms are forums for communication and expression, just like 
newspapers, libraries, and many other “offline” entities.200 Yet these 
offline equivalents are not state actors.201 While the internet has 
created many unique questions, the rules for a platform or entity 
should not change simply because it exists online. When an online 
platform serves the same purpose as an offline platform, the same 
rules should apply. 
The advent of the internet and social media is not the first time 
new technology has raised new questions. In this respect, the 
internet is not unique. Since the dawn of time, mankind has 
developed new technologies. With each new technology comes new 
questions. Yet they are but variations on a familiar theme. Unless 
the fundamental function changes, the mere novelty of the 
technology ought not merit changes in the law. New technology 
                                                 
(calling the state action doctrine a “conceptual disaster area”); sources cited supra 
note 190. 
198 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Public-Private Penumbra–Fourteen Years 
Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 1291 (1982); Hila Shamir, The Public/Private 
Distinction Now: The Challenges of Privatization and of the Regulatory State, 15 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 2 (2014) (citing numerous sources critiquing and 
supporting the distinction). 
199 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Is Internet Exceptionalism Dead?, in THE NEXT 
DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 179, 179–80 (Berin 
Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2011); Eric Goldman, The Third Wave of Internet 
Exceptionalism, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Mar. 11, 2009), 
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/03/the_third_wave.htm. 
200 See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text. 
201 See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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alone should not dictate changes in the law.202 The law should be 
developed and applied independent of the medium.203 Courts should 
not abolish the public/private distinction online unless they are 
willing to do so offline. Furthermore, courts should not expand the 
definition of state action in the online sphere where it has not done 
so offline. Social media platforms, newspapers, and book clubs all 
serve the fundamental purpose of facilitating communication and 
expression. Unless courts are willing to extend state action to 
newspapers and book clubs, they should not extend state action to 
social media platforms.204 
 
C.  Alternative Regulation Methods 
  
Professor Lawrence Lessig of Harvard Law School has 
articulated four “modalities of regulation”—four ways in which 
behavior can be shaped and controlled.205 These four modalities are 
                                                 
202 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 145, at 208 (1996); Sommer, supra note 
151, at 1148 (“Law is a conservative practice, drawing heavily on analogy and 
history. Of course, legal doctrines will change; they always do. The new 
information technologies will trigger some of these changes. But with a few 
exceptions, these changes will exist only in the details.”). 
203 See Easterbrook, supra note 145, at 208. Contra Orin S. Kerr, Foreword: 
Accounting for Technological Change, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 403 
(2013) (“A law created for one world may have a very different impact when 
applied to the facts of a different era. As a result, changing technology and social 
practice often trigger a need for legal adaptation.”). 
204 Actually, not applying the First Amendment to social media platforms 
might in fact help platforms address current issues like Russian interference and 
targeted bots, since platforms would not have to be concerned about “censoring” 
those voices and could invoke their editorial privilege. See Miami Herald Publ’g 
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (discussing the important of a 
newspaper’s editorial privilege). Just as the New York Times can refuse to publish 
an advertisement it suspects was sponsored by Russia attempting to improperly 
influence a U.S. election, so too could Facebook regulate its ads to thwart Russian 
bots. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Facebook Removes More Accounts Tied to Russian 
‘Troll Factory’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/business/facebook-russian-trolls-
removed.html. 
205 Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507 (1999). 
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law, social norms, markets, and architecture.206 The law is merely 
one way to control objectionable behavior. Thus, while social media 
platform’s content regulation may be harmful and concerning, the 
First Amendment is not the only potential or viable solution. 
In addition to regulation by law, Lessig notes that social norms 
are enforced by the community, and the markets regulate by price.207 
Both of these modalities can be and have been used to remedy 
objectionable content regulation online. Social media platforms 
have come under extreme scrutiny for their content regulation 
practices.208 Moreover, the scrutiny and pressure has originated both 
from Congress and private entities.209 As a result of that scrutiny, 
platforms have begun to acknowledge the unique role they play in 
modern society and the need to take responsibility for improving 
how they handle these challenges.210 
For example, Facebook has already taken steps in response to 
criticism of its takedown procedures. In April 2018, the website 
published its formerly secret, internal community guidelines for 
public access.211 These guidelines are quite detailed.212 While they 
may not be perfect, they add a new level of transparency. 
Additionally, Facebook has instituted an appeals process, giving 
users the opportunity to explain their content and provide more 
                                                 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 See, e.g., 2017 Was a Year of Scrutiny for Social Media and Other Tech, 
PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/2017-
was-a-year-of-scrutiny-for-social-media-and-other-tech. 
209 See, e.g., supra note 208 and accompanying text; Tom Hudson, Social 
Media, Search Under Scrutiny on Wall Street and Capitol Hill, MIAMI HERALD 
(Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/latest-
news/article217602880.html; Social Media Firms Under Scrutiny for 'Russian 
Meddling’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-
canada-41821359. 
210 See, e.g., Twitter: Transparency and Accountability: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm on Energy & Commerce, 115th Cong. (Sept. 5, 2018) (written statement 
of Jack Dorsey, Chief Executive Officer, Twitter, Inc.), 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/20180905/108642/HHRG-115-IF00-
Wstate-DorseyJ-20180905.pdf [hereinafter Twitter: Transparency and 
Accountability]. 
211 See Woollacott, supra note 50. 
212 See Community Standards: Introduction, supra note 53. 
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context if they think their content does not violate the guidelines.213 
Recent policy changes at YouTube (although arguably not a social 
media platform within the definition of this Article214) serve as 
another example of how platforms are becoming more responsive. 
In June 2019, YouTube announced that it would increase its efforts 
to remove “hateful content” such as videos that deny historical 
events or that advocate group discrimination.215 Content targeted by 
the new policy would include videos promoting Nazi ideology, 
denying the Holocaust, or denying the shooting at Sandy Hook 
Elementary School.216 These types of changes exemplify how 
platforms are regulated by social norms and pressure. 
Furthermore, market forces are becoming more influential 
regulators. For example, consumers have begun calling for brands 
to put pressure on social media platforms to better handle data, fake 
news, and offensive content.217 As brands begin to recognize how 
consumers link their brand to social media platforms, those brands 
may begin to exert economic influence over social media platforms 
by threatening to pull advertisements if the platforms do not begin 
to more effectively address these important issues. Because most 
social media platforms rely heavily on advertisement revenue, 
consumers and advertisers have a direct leveraging tool to 
encourage, or even force, platforms to make policy changes.218 
                                                 
213 See Woollacott, supra note 50. Instagram, which is owned by Facebook, 
also implemented a similar structure. See Changes to Our Account Disable Policy, 
INSTAGRAM (July 18, 2019), https://instagram-
press.com/blog/2019/07/18/changes-to-our-account-disable-policy/. 
214 See supra note 18–21 and accompanying text. 
215 See Georgia Wells, YouTube Bans Hateful Videos From Platform, WALL 
STREET J. (June 5, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/youtube-bans-
supremacist-videos-11559754035?mod=djemwhatsnews. 
216 See id. 
217 See Trust Barometer Special Report: Brands and Social Media, EDELMAN 
(June 18, 2018), https://www.edelman.com/research/trust-barometer-brands-
social-media. 
218 See, e.g., Wells, supra note 215 (“YouTube also has to factor in the 
concerns of advertisers, who covet the huge and devoted audience that the 
platform brings but don’t want their brands to be associated with hate or 
extremism. . . . [N]ew ads on YouTube videos are critical to the conglomerate’s 
[Google’s] future.”). 
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The stock market itself has also reflected the pressure placed on 
social media platforms. During Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey’s 
testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on possible 
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Twitter’s stock 
dropped six percent.219 In contrast, Facebook’s stock rose nearly 
four and a half percent when Mark Zuckerberg confidently testified 
before Congress, admitting that Facebook had made mistakes in the 
past and describing practical steps the company was taking to 
remedy various issues.220 Profit-driven social media platforms 
cannot ignore stock market trends and how the market reacts directly 
to platforms’ action or inaction.221 
Since social media platforms depend on users to maintain 
relevance, platforms will respond to criticism and outcry. The power 
of users to influence platforms should not be underestimated. Money 
is a motivator. Platforms will not and cannot discount the financial 
repercussions of ignoring the social and market influences currently 
at play.222 
In the legal realm, the First Amendment is not the only available 
                                                 
219 Amelia Lucas, Twitter Shares Fall 6% as CEO Jack Dorsey Testifies 
Before Senate, CNBC (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/05/twitter-
shares-drop-6percent-during-dorseys-senate-testimony.html. 
220 See Mark Zuckerberg Testimony: Senators Question Facebook’s 
Commitment to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/us/politics/mark-zuckerberg-
testimony.html. 
221 Stock market performance can also be linked to the advertising issues 
discussed above. See also Wells, supra note 215 (discussing how, after an 
earnings call at Alphabet Inc. (Google’s parent company) where advertisement 
growth was reported to be decelerating, “Alphabet’s stock took its biggest dive in 
nearly seven years.”). 
222 See Emily Stewart, The $120-Billion Reason We Can’t Expect Facebook 
to Police Itself, VOX (July 28, 2018), https://www.vox.com/business-and-
finance/2018/7/28/17625218/facebook-stock-price-twitter-earnings. While Ms. 
Stewart argues that Facebook and Twitter cannot be trusted to regulate 
themselves, her analysis demonstrates how market forces affect platforms’ 
decisions. Ms. Stewart accurately notes that “big money can speak pretty loud” 
and that platforms will make profit-motivated decisions. Id. Her observation is the 
very reason why platforms are likely to improve their policies: because stock 
prices reflect consumer confidence, and because consumers place pressure on 
brands (in turn pressuring the platforms), platforms will recognize the financial 
repercussions and react accordingly. 
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form of regulation. For example, existing state contract law might 
be invoked if a social media platform fails to properly apply its own 
content guidelines.223 Since users agree to abide by Instagram’s 
Community Guidelines when they agree to the service’s Terms of 
Use,224  Instagram’s failure to properly abide by its own Community 
Guidelines could be considered a breach of the Terms of Use by 
Instagram. The legal foundation of such a claim is unclear at best 
since some courts have ruled that Facebook’s Terms of Service do 
not create affirmative obligations for Facebook.225 In fact, Facebook 
has used its own Terms of Service to successfully defend against a 
breach of contract claim.226 But with platforms beginning to publicly 
acknowledge their duty to consumers and rework their internal 
regulation policies,227 it is possible that those policies and terms of 
service could be interpreted to confer contractual obligations on the 
platform and not just the user. 
A more tenable legal enforcement option is consumer protection 
law. Agencies like the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) have 
rules in place that govern improper practices by social media 
platforms.228 Moreover, the Justice Department has already begun 
talks to explore consumer protection in the context of social media 
platforms.229 The FTC has brought enforcement actions against 
                                                 
223 See James L. Gattuso, The Downside of Regulating Facebook, FOUND. 
FOR ECON. EDUC. (May 06, 2018), https://fee.org/articles/the-downside-of-
regulating-facebook/. 
224 See Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM, INC., 
https://help.instagram.com/581066165581870?helpref=faq_content (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2018). 
225 See, e.g., Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1064 (N.D. 
Cal. 2016); Young v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:10–cv–03579, 2010 WL 4269304, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010). 
226 See Caraccioli, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 1063–64. 
227 See, e.g., Twitter: Transparency and Accountability, supra note 210, at 1 
(“We are committed to hold ourselves publicly accountable towards progress of 
our health initiative.”). 
228 See Gattuso, supra note 223. Under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012), the FTC 
can prevent entities from “using unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.” 
229 See U.S. Justice Department to Discuss Consumer Protection at Social 
Media Meeting, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-justice-tech/u-s-justice-dept-to-discuss-consumer-protection-at-social-
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various social media platforms, including Twitter, Snapchat, and the 
now-defunct Google Buzz.230 In 2019, the FTC fined Facebook 
approximately $5 billion for mishandling users’ personal 
information—the largest fine the federal government has ever levied 
against a technology company.231 Most recently, many large 
technology companies have come under considerable scrutiny in the 
antitrust context. Facebook is facing an antitrust probe by the 
FTC.232 Moreover, several state Attorneys General have announced 
their own antitrust investigation into both Facebook and Google.233 
Although the FTC’s focus in the technology sphere has been on data 
privacy and security,234 the agency could also focus its efforts on 
fairness in content regulation.235 The Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) is another viable candidate for the task.236 
Although the FCC is currently only authorized to regulate 
communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable, it is 
a fundamental authority for communication and technology 
regulation.237 Regulating social media platforms could very well 
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230 See, e.g., Julie Brill, Privacy & Consumer Protection in Social Media, 90 
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N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/technology/facebook-ftc-
fine.html?module=inline. 
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ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 6, 2019), 
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and-data/. 
234 See, e.g., Social Media Meeting, supra note 229; Brill, supra note 230, at 
1296–97. 
235 See Brill, supra note 230, at 1299 (“Consumers have certain expectations 
based on what they are told will be done with their information, and social 
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visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
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come within the purview of this agency. Its expertise on 
communication and technology would make it well suited for the 
task. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
While the First Amendment, coupled with the public function 
exception, is an appealing remedy to social media censorship, the 
legal and policy costs outweigh the benefits of extending the 
doctrine. The legal and policy foundations for extending the 
exception are weak and would require an unnecessary degree of 
internet exceptionalism as justification. Alternative regulation 
methods—like consumer and brand pressure, market forces, and 
Congressional and executive agency action—can adequately 
resolve many of these challenges. Social media and the internet may 
raise questions, but the questions are not new, and the answers need 
not be radical. 
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